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1.
The philosophical excursus presented here differs from all the 
others. While in the majority of them we presented Rorty’s 
polemics and discussions with other philosophers -  according to 
the view that Rorty’s philosophy is being coined to a large extent 
in confrontations with them rather than it is written in isolation, 
while in one of them we present in an expanded version the picture 
of what Rorty criticizes (namely we include the Lyotardian concept 
of the "différend" in the context of the Rortyan inacceptance of it), 
here we are trying once again to reverse perspectives. We want 
to show Zygmunt Bauman’s account of the intellectual and the 
philosopher in the context of Rorty’s account of the role and tasks 
of the philosopher today presented throughout the book. The point 
of connection between the two thinkers will be mild criticism of 
Rorty presented in numerous places by Bauman. Rorty, as far as 
I know, never responded to it therefore so far the exchange 
between them is one-sided. But the way of seeing culture, 
philosophy, modernity and postmodernity as well as intellectuals 
is so convergent in the two thinkers that I think it is useful to present 
Bauman’s account of them. This, I hope, will throw additional, 
a lthough not d irect, light to European connections of 
neopragmatism, and although Rorty does not participate in 
discussions with Bauman, the closeness of their standpoints 
produces extremely interesting tensions between them.
The present philosophical excursus will thus assume the 
following shape: first we shall try to outline Bauman’s attitude 
towards Rorty in questions that are of interest to us here, then we 
shall present a wider picture emerging from his works published 
in recent years, treating his vision as a competing, independent 
and parallel with respect to Rorty’s. Both heroes grew out of 
different philosophical traditions, dealt with different questions and 
issues in their older works, and today they use different 
vocabularies and different philosophical traditions. But what links
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them is more or less similar philosophical conclusions. While a lot 
is being written in the world about Rorty and Derrida, Habermas 
or Foucault, this additional Polish-English context of (not only) 
Rorty’s works is still not as much commented on as it deserves. 
And although Rorty so far has not taken his position with respect 
to Bauman, I get the impression that Bauman may provide in the 
coming years one of the most interesting contexts in discussions 
of certain -  European, post-Heideggerian and post-Nietzschean, 
let us say -  themes of his philosophy. Not to mention the value of 
Bauman’s sociological hermeneutics out of the Rortyan context, 
as one of the most stimulating and inspiring source of ideas in 
postmodernity (and it is important to bear in mind Anthony 
Giddens’ words about him: "the theorist of postmodernity").
Let the two thinkers be linked at the beginning with a single 
Rorty’s remark made recently in an article from Dissent in which 
he excludes from generally ins ign ifican t reflection on 
postmodernity only "Zygmunt Bauman and Gianni Vattimo".1 Let 
us leave Vattimo alone in the present work, believing that the time 
will come to get closer to his "weak thought", his Nietzsche and 
his Heidegger. Let us rather deal with the picture of Rorty present 
in a merely outlined form in Zygmunt Bauman.
In most general terms: Bauman is critical of Rorty due to quite 
different reasons that the majority of his critics -  namely due to the 
fact that in Bauman’s view Rorty stopped in half-way, did not draw 
further conclusions, stopped in the place that vaguely promises 
further road. Rorty appears as an insufficiently radical philosopher 
as far as postmodern challenges are concerned. In two books, 
namely in Legislators and Interpreters (1987) and in a collection 
of earlier essays published as Intimations of Postmodernity 
(1992), Rorty is ascribed by Bauman to the tradition of "legislators" 
rather than "interpreters", that is to say, to traditional philosophers 
with traditional legitimizational ambitions who "demand the 
continuation of legislative function for the sake of the importance 
intrinsically carried by concern with reason, ethical norms, 
aesthetic standards"1 2 In another, later, book -  Modernity and
1 Richard Rorty, ''Movements and Campaigns", Dissent, Winter 1995.
2 Zygmunt Bauman, Intimations of Postmodernity (London: Routledge, 
1992), pp. 19-20.
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Ambivalence (1991) -  there appears for the first time a more 
detailed analysis of Rorty’s "solidarity" from his Contingency, 
Irony, and Solidarity from which it turns out that it is supposed to 
lead to dangerous indifference. Bauman’s response is 
unambiguously formulated in the passage entitled "From 
Tolerance to Solidarity" in which, obviously, a (mere) tolerance is 
represented by Rorty, a (new) solidarity -  by Bauman himself.
Let us discuss the first, earlier in time, Bauman’s criticism, to 
pass then on to the most important for our purposes passage 
devoted to Bauman’s "surpassing" of Rorty. Generally speaking, 
in the first version of his criticism, Bauman characterizes Rorty (like 
Adorno who is on the other end of the range of criticized legislative 
positions assumed in contemporary philosophy) by the "refusal to 
abandon the legislative mode of intellectual discourse".3 Adorno 
represents despair, a feeling of defeat, while Rorty is to react to 
the present situation in culture with a simple "so what?" The task 
of the philosopher is the preservation of unique values of Western 
civilization, the preservation o f-so  exposed in Philosophy and the 
Mirror of Nature -  "conversation of the West", keeping alive our 
local, Western, liberal tradition. Bauman sees this strategy as 
insufficient. He writes about the other, more radical strategy 
requiring a redefinition of the role and social status of the 
intellectual in the form of the passage from the metaphor of the 
"legislator" to that of the "interpreter.4 In Legislators and 
Interpreters Bauman says that neither Gadamer’s hermeneutics, 
nor Rorty’s neopragmatism, forecastthe rejection of the traditional, 
Western vocation of the intellectual. These are merely forms of 
defence of the way of life of the Western intellectual in the face of 
a gradual disappearance of certainty grounded once in evident 
"superiority" of Western societies.5 He says, for instance, that
3 Ibidem, p. 21.
4 Let us only mention here in passing that the attitude to Rorty as an already 
radical supporter of interpretive reason is also present in Bauman in the same 
collection of essays, though ( I suppose) in the one written later. The author says 
the following: "The strategy of interpretive reason has been elaborated in various 
forms by Freud, Heidegger, late Wittgenstein, Gadamer, Ricoeurand Derrida; it 
finds today arguably its most radical, uncompromising expression in the work of 
Richard Rorty”, ibidem, p. 126.
5 See Zygmunt Bauman, Legislators and Interpreters. On Modernity, 
Post-modernity and Intellectuals (Oxford: Polity Press, 1987), pp. 144-145.
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Rorty is quite outspoken about the purpose of this 
willingness to talk, to listen to people, to weigh the 
consequences of our action upon other people, and 
suggests that it is the proper subject-matter for 
philosophy: its purpose is to continue the conversation 
which is unm istakab ly our pro ject, European 
intellectual’s way of life.6
Rorty’s answer, "the most radical of all possible answers to the 
postmodern condition"7, is a strategy that finds legitimacy of an 
intellectual activity in a moral value of one’s own work as ascribed 
to intellectuals themselves. If others do not need legitimacy 
provided by philosophers any more, we are no longer providing 
them, no problem. With one restriction of which Bauman is always 
aware and of which Rorty rarely speaks and writes (and which, 
incidentally, shows at the same time the differences between 
hopes for the future of philosophy within the Academy in England 
and in the USA): the concern of academic philosophy for its 
self-reproduction -  "until further cuts".
Let us pass on to the criticism of Rorty from the book on 
modernity and ambivalence. Let us note first, though, that the 
theme of links between contingency, tolerance, and solidarity 
appears also in the "Introduction" to Intimations of Postmodenity. 
Bauman says there that tolerance is possible in one form only -  
that of solidarity. Tolerance consists in the acceptance of 
significance of the difference of the Other, requires the acceptance 
of subjectivity of the "tolerated". But as such, it is not enough for 
the "tolerated" not to be humiliated. For, Bauman says, what if 
tolerance takes the following form: "you are wrong and I am right; 
I agree that not everybody can be like me, not for the time being 
at any rate, not at once; the fact that I bear with your otherness 
does not exonerate your error, it only proves my generosity“.8 
Tolerance thus in Bauman’s view has to offer more than the
6 Ibidem, p. 144.
7 Ibidem, p. 197.
8 Zygmunt Bauman, 'Introduction" to Intimations of Postmodernity, p. xxi.
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acceptance of diversity and coexistence: it must call for the 
admission of the equivalence of knowledge-producing discourses, 
it must call for a dialogue. I take this argumentation to refer directly 
to Rorty from Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. The same link 
appears in Bauman’s Modernity and Ambivalence. According to 
Bauman, Rortyan "kindness" comes from fear and is not "the last 
station on the road to emancipation".9 The general Bauman’s idea 
is that to discover fully the emancipatory potential present in 
contingency seen as destiny it is not enough to avoid humiliation. 
One has to respect others -  respect them for their otherness. One 
has to respect in others their otherness and in strangers their 
strangeness. My bond appears as a "community of destiny rather 
than merely similarity of fate. The latter is satisfied with mutual 
tolerance; the community of destiny cries for solidarity".10 I It is a 
direct criticism of Rorty. Let us read it in more detail. Bauman 
shows two roads leading from tolerance: one leads towards 
solidarity (his own) and the other to "indifference and seclusion".11 
Bauman locates himself in opposition to Rorty which can be seen 
also on the level of vocabulary; let us listen how the words used 
are value-loaded. "To respect others" (for it does not suffice to 
"avoid humiliating others", Bauman on Rorty), "responsibility" 
(rather than "indifferent neutrality", "cold kindness", tolerance as a 
"possible manifestation of loftiness", "painful humiliation"), "the 
road from tolerance to solidarity" (rather than to "indifference and 
seclusion").12 The road to be followed, being aware of the 
contingency of being, comes from fate to destiny, from tolerance 
to (new, non-Rortyan) solidarity -  for "The new solidarity of the 
contingent is grounded in silence".13 Rorty’s solution is only 
half-way because he stays by dangerous and ambivalent 
tolerance and one must go further, towards (new) solidarity...
I fully agree with Zygmunt Bauman’s arguments pertaining to 
dangers of tolerant attitude as he outlines it. But I do not think that
9 Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and Ambivalence (Oxford: Polity Press, 
1991 ), p. 235 (a splendid Polish translation was done by Janina Bauman).
10 Ibidem, p 236.
II A Polish typescript translated by Janina Bauman, p. 220.
12 Zygmunt Bauman, ibidem, pp. 219, 219, 303, 303, 303, 220.
13 Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and Ambivalence, p. 236.
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there is so much that differs Rorty and Bauman, that Rorty leaves 
so much room for humiliation of others and, finally, that one cannot 
accept - which follows clearly from Bauman’s line of reasoning - 
the whole Rorty’s conception of solidarity based on the definition 
of the liberal as the one for whom "cruelty is the worst thing we 
do". It seems to me that intuitions expressed by both thinkers go 
in similar directions, with emphasis put somehow differently (e.g. 
Bauman stresses much stronger the "otherness of the other" and 
the "strangeness of the stranger"). Rorty’s conception 
undoubtedly requires clarifications, of which Rorty takes care all 
the time in his writings, but I do not get the impression that the 
difference between them is as radical as Bauman outlines it. I 
would like to present here Bauman’s dilemmas so as to throw 
some additional light on Rorty’s work -  after the above initial 
remarks, let us regard the passage on Bauman as another 
"European context", another possible though thus far absent (with 
the exception of a single reference cited at the beginning) 
connection of neopragmatism.
2 .
Zygmunt Bauman is one of those few contemporary thinkers 
with whom it is worth while thinking together about our postmodern 
condition, and thinking together with him does not necessarily 
have to mean following his roads and accepting his conclusions, 
though -  it may also mean thinking parallel to his own thinking, 
one that sometimes crosses with it in some points of convergence, 
sometimes departs from it for various, often idiosyncratic and 
individual reasons. Although reading Bauman requires close 
attention, as his particular works are interrelated, mutually 
complementary and supplementary, nevertheless the attention 
paid to them is amply rewarded.
For the perspective of his sociological hermeneutics (as he 
sometimes calls his thinking) is extremely productive for today’s 
thinking of culture -  both in itself, as well as confronted with 
proposals and suggestions of other postmodern critics and critics 
of postmodernity, especially (in a strong sense of the term) 
philosophical ones. A peculiar paradox becomes apparent, at least
r
as far as I can see it precisely as a philosopher, that Bauman’s 
questions appeal stronger to a philosophical discourse of 
postmodernity rather than to a sociological one. There is a growing 
number of sociological volumes devoted to "intellectuals" of today, 
but none of them seems to compare in its intellectual horizons with 
diagnoses and suggestions of the author of Legislators and 
Interpreters.14 The controversy that for a dozen or so years has 
been taking place in France and in the USA among philosophers, 
finds in Bauman its most interesting supplement. Therefore, 
crossing traditional disciplinary boundaries, it is worth while 
reading him in the context of philosophical discussions, as in these 
discussions Bauman’s voice -  although indirect and rather from 
behind of the main currents of a philosophical discourse of today 
-  is a voice that deserves the highest attention. And let the author 
of Intimations of Postmodernity forgive me the fact that I am trying 
hard here to associate him with what perhaps is not dearest to him, 
not closest to his thinking from his own perspective (i.e. with 
postmodernism and neopragmatism, to use these two vague 
terms). The point is, though -  and let us provide it as legitimacy of 
a sort -  that habentsua fata libelli. Books have their own fate, their 
fate depends on the direction we push them in (i.e. we -  readers), 
depends on what books we will put them next to in the great library 
of humanity. Their fate depends on what we will manage to do with 
them, for what purpose we will be able to use them, what interests 
we will have while reading them and writing about them. Nietzsche 
wrote about it, Walter Benjamin did, finally Richard Rorty used this 
saying when he was asked what provides legitimacy for his 
reading of Donald Davidson on the one hand and Jacques Derrida 
on the other.15 Davidson does not seem too sympathetic to Rorty’s
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14 What fails in this respect are recently published sociological and 
philosophical works: Intellectuals. Aesthetics, Politics, Academics, ed. B. 
Robbins (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990) or Intellectuals in 
Liberal Democracies, ed.A.G. Gagnon (Praeger Publishers, 1987). On the other 
hand, Michael Walzer’s The Company of Critics (New York: Basic Books, 1987), 
a collection of essays, "case studies" of different thinkers with a common horizon, 
seems to be quite interesting; still more intriguing is Allan Stoekl’s Agonies of the 
Intellectual (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992).
15 See Richard Rorty, "Réponse à Jacques Bouveresse" in the congenial 
volume Lire Rorty. Le pragmatisme et ses conséquences (Paris: U eclat, 1992),
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endeavours that reduce him to an intellectual shield in struggles 
of Rorty’s neopragmatism with his opponents; Derrida, as far as I 
know, has so far kept silence on the subject. But, anyway, great 
polemics are taking place all the time, what is more, they are highly 
interesting, there emerge groups of "defenders" of both 
philosophers against their Rortyan "pragmaticization" which take 
care of purity and undisturbed transmission of their masters’s 
views...16 Given a certain (a)methodological charity, perhaps it not 
so in te re s tin g  to get into de ta ils  of the essence of 
"misunderstanding" in such readings of works of Davidson, 
Derrida (or Bauman, for that matter) that suggest (be they even 
non-existing) connections and parallels, as the fate of books is as 
contingent as our whole postmodern being. There are no 
non-contingent and universal foundations, thus there is also no 
author’s foundation of a text that provides him a priori with greater 
rights and more important voice in the "cultural conversation" 
taking place. The voice of the author, traditionally important, has 
already become at the same time one of many equally valid voices 
of readers and commentators. On the one hand, one has to take 
into consideration the "modesty of the age" about which Philippe 
Lacoue-Labarthe writes almost in the form of the manifesto in his 
La Fiction du politique17, on the other hand it is just with the help 
of the power of precisely this modesty that philosophy has a still 
greater possibility -  chance? -  to become a commentary to 
already written and currently being written philosophical works, a
p. 156, or the answer Rorty gave to F. Farrell’s complaints from Subjectivity, 
Realism and Postmodernism."... I do notthink it matters whether Davidson would 
or would not be sympathetic to such an extrapolation. If you borrow somebody’s 
idea for a different purpose, is it really necessary to clear this novel use with the 
originator of the idea?", a typescript, p. 1.
16 Let me provide only two examples: Frank Farrell, Subjectivity, Realism and 
Postmodernism -  the Recovery of the World (Cambridge: CUP, 1994) the 
opening sentence: "... Richard Rorty, in his various writings, has given an 
unreliable account of recent philosophy. He gets certain figures wrong, Davidson 
in particular...", p. xi. On the other hand, obsessively anti-Rortyan Christopher 
Norris from his four recent books about Derrida, deconstruction or "truth" about 
postmodernism.
17"... Could it not be derisory to claim that one is engaged in philosophy, or 
- still worse -  that one is a philosopher?", asks Ph. Lacoue-Labarthe in his 
Heidegger, Art and Politics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), p. 1.
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commentary to a still enlarging and changing canon of works, a 
commentary to commentaries. And a commentary always gives 
birth to a (Bloomian) temptation of a "strong misreading", a "poetic 
misprision", since, as he says in The Anxiety of Influence, the 
meaning of a poem can only be a poem, but another poem -  a 
poem not itself.^8
Thus -  Bauman’s poem read in the mirror of other poems... 
What inclines one to make such a reading is also an extremely 
metaphorical and highly individual way of writing of the author. It 
happens in Bauman, let us bear it in mind, that the whole book is 
supported by several metaphors chosen with impressive erudition 
and ingenuity. It is difficult to imagine a "rational" discussion of a 
traditional philosopher with metaphors; a metaphor can be 
confronted with another metaphor, but it is not comfortable in the 
way arguments are. Just like in the case of Rorty, the construction 
of an "ironist" produces a distance and pushes the edge of irony 
in two opposite directions at the same time ("I am saying this, but 
maybe I am saying that? I am saying this, but only ’ironically’, how 
could I take it ’seriously’" etc. etc.), depending on the actual 
direction of an attack and the sophistication of polemics, also in 
Bauman the support of his vision of modernity and postmodernity 
on several carefully chosen metaphors may bring about similar 
helplessness of a (traditional) critic. For, let us ask, what is 
supposed to mean the opposition of "leg is la tors" and 
"interpreters", "pilgrims" and "wanderers", what are metaphors of 
"vagabonds", "nomads", "tourists" or "flaneurs", if we would like to 
look at them with cold eyes of a strange and insensitive to the 
poetry of words and magic of pictures analytician of the present 
and decoder of texts devoted to it? The method of decoding, 
deciphering -  just like one deciphers the truth -  must fail here 18
18 Harold Bloom, The Anxiety of Influence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1973), p. 70. "Strong poets" make the history of poetry by misreading one another 
- it might be asked whether "strong philosophers" could not be making the history 
of philosophy by misreading one another, by producing their own idiosyncratic 
sequences of philosophers (just like Rorty creates and uses the sequence 
"Plato-Kant" or "Nietzsche-Heidegger-Derrida")? The majority of "proper" 
interpretations of poetry is worse than mistakes, says Bloom. "Perhaps there are 
only more or less creative or interesting misreadings"..., p. 43. Rorty’s 
redescriptions and recontextualizations versus Romantic "genius" in poetry?
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totally, what a reader Is left with is the (Nietzschean) awareness 
of perspectival character of interpretation and getting out of what 
the whole history of Western metaphysics has always required him 
to do, as Derrida noted for the first time in his discussion with 
Lévi-Strauss in “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the 
Human Sciences".19 20One cannot get away with deciphering 
metaphors, as, struggling argumentatively with a metaphor, and 
consequently refuting it, one remains with a meaningless, devoid 
of significant senses, text.
Metaphors are fundamental in Bauman’s thinking of the world 
-  let us listen to a characteristic statement from Two Essays on 
Postmodern Morality, as the metaphor of a nomad as an ideal type 
is "imperfect and misleading", the only unambiguous task left is:
20to look for other metaphors...
Bauman confronts an old metaphor with a new one, rather than 
confronts it with argumentation against an old metaphor; a 
scrupulous investigator of postmodernity does not confuse levels 
in thinking of the world and in feeling it, neither in himself, nor in 
confrontations with others. Who fights with the help of metaphors, 
dies of metaphors, it could be said. What is important is whether 
a metaphor -  another metaphor -  can be killed, is it easy to 
literalize it? A dead metaphor is a literalized one, but what is 
needed for that is time and arduous work of culture, with which 
fame is usually associated. ..Metaphoras one of (postmodern) "life 
strategies"? Metaphor as a contribution to a picture of a status of 
the postmodern intellectual? For as it is difficult to argue with a 
metaphor, it is also difficult to argue with someone who "passes 
rapidly from Hemingway to Proust to Hitler to Marx to Foucault to 
Mary Douglas to the present situation in Southeast Asia to Ghandi 
to Sophocles", as Richard Rorty says in his Consequences of
19 See Jacques Derrida, "Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the 
Human Sciences" in Writing and Difference (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1978), p. 292.
20 Zygmunt Bauman, Dwa eseje o moralnościponowoczesnej [Two Essays 
on Postmodern Morality (in Polish, Warsaw: Instytut Kultury, 1994, p. 20
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Pragmatism about a post-Philosophical intellectual.21 It is difficult 
to argue with someone who is a "name dropper", an expert of 
proper names with which he plays being afraid of getting stuck in 
one vocabulary, one -  be it even self-chosen -  perspective, one 
and privileged view of the world. Bauman and his metaphors... 
Metaphors in Bauman’s texts... An explicit -  practical -  end of a 
certain way of practising the humanities, philosophy, be it even 
sociology; an end of a certain figure of the humanist to which 
modernity managed to get us accustomed. Perhaps the beginning 
of a new way of thinking of culture in the post-legislative, 
post-metanarrative, post-Philosophical epoch (as this state is 
called by Bauman, Lyotard and Rorty, respectively)?
In Bauman, that way of thinking derives from a deep and 
irreducible suspicion of the project of Modernity which finally, 
through its "gardening" dreams, had led to the Holocaust, after 
which "nothing will be the way it was". Lyotard in Le Différend calls 
Auschwitz le signe d'histoire or événement, Lacoue-Labarthe 
names it his La Fiction du politique a caesura {la césure) of the 
speculative; apart from saying with the latter that in Auschwitz 
"God died", that a dark, so far unseen side of modernity manifested 
itself, one can also say that (German) speculative philosophy with 
its emancipatory wishes, supported by Reason and History, died 
there as well. That philosophical side is studied by Germans and 
Frenchmen, from Theodor W. Adorno from Negative Dialectics, 
Emmanuel Levinas e.g. from his texts about Blanchot, the whole 
recent German Historikerstreit- the dispute of German historians 
with the participation of Habermas and Tugendhadt, to Lyotard 
from Heidegger et 'les juifs’, Lacoue-Labarthe from La Fiction du 
politique, and many others. How to "philosophize after Auschwitz" 
-  that was the question put forward for the first time by Adorno, 
and in this form it has been present in culture ever since. By his 
own means, on his own and following his own paths, Zygmunt 
Bauman comes to similar, fundamental questions about modernity 
in his Modernity and the Holocaust. Let us listen to him:
21 Richard Rorty, CP, p. xl.
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Modernity, as we remember, is an age of artificial order 
and of grand societal designs, the era of planners, 
visionaries, and -  more generally -  "gardeners" who 
treat society as a virgin plot of land to be expertly 
designed and then cultivated and doctored to keep the 
designed form.22
It seems to be one of the most beautiful (para)definitions of 
modernity, obviously, knowing Bauman’s façon de parle -  a 
metaphorical one. Let us think of it for a while and let us read it 
slightly differently, from a different side and in different 
vocabularies. "Planners" and "visionaries" may be -  let us assume 
the following descriptions as a "possible world" -  traditional 
intellectuals of the period of modernity, those of great ambitions 
and superior status in culture; more and less important, more and 
less philosophically-minded, those who planned the Jacobean 
Terror and those who planned the Bolshevik terror. (How different 
faces metaphors of planners can assume can be testified by "glass 
houses", in Poland, fo llow ing  Żerom ski and German 
Glasarchitektur, the hope for "bright" future, while for George 
Orwell -  the nightmare of an accomplished utopia, man subjected 
to the gaze of the Other, deprived of intimacy, as it is obsessively 
present in Sartre, Foucault or Barthes, which is beautifully shown
-  under a general label of "denigration of vision" -  in Martin Jay’s 
recent impressive study23). Bauman’s gardener is not Kosinski’s 
Gardener from Being There -  he is rather a self-conceited erudite, 
aware of his exceptionality in culture, interpreter of the present and 
planner of the future. Gardeners taking care of a "virgin plot of land"
- society, ratherthan society seen as e.g. "English garden" in which 
work consists in cultivation and maintenance of the status quo. 
Gardeners as executioners -  those who pull weeds out of the 
social plot of land (supported by the great idea of "racial hygiene") 
or who kill (be it even with Zyklon B) bugs, fast disseminating and
22 Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Ithaca, NewYork: Cornell 
University Press, 1989), p. 113.
23 Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes. The Denigration of Vision in 
Twentieth-Century French Thought (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1993), preceded by chapters published previously e.g. on Lyotard and Foucault.
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parasitic on assumption. Sanitary action, hygienic challenge, 
getting rid of filth and bugs... They were specific gardeners, indeed. 
So in modernity a virgin plot of land needed planning -  and that 
was done by experts in ideas hired by Leviathan, and needed 
putting into practice, for which Leviathan had different personae 
(who saw a serious philosopher in a uniform of the SS or in a grey 
greatcoat of the NKWD?).
What the euphemism "to keep the designed form” used by 
Bauman in the above quotation might mean? It might mean, for 
instance, terror to which precise, disciplined and rational 
bureaucracy was employed; and the bureaucracy lacked just a 
grand vision of a perfect society, a vision of a better and more just 
world (which will be e.g. Judenfrei, or in which there will be no 
bourgeoisie or no other "weeds"). "Modern dreams are given 
absolute power" -  says Bauman, and thereby modern genocide 
is born. And these grand visions are postmodern metarecits, 
Lyotardian great narratives from his La Condition postmoderne to 
which one can only feel distrust today; "gardener" vision of 
modernity is the vision in which telos is already known -  the end 
of present sufferings (and crimes) is future happiness planned by 
smart minds here and now. Given a traditional role and modern 
status of intellectuals, these smart minds are never lacking, they 
are being created and they create themselves. Fortunately, there 
is fewer and fewer gardeners today. Fewer and fewer candidates 
for gardeners. For it is no longer that easy to cultivate the garden, 
and the Idea of future Emancipation no longer appeals to human 
hearts...
3.
Zygmunt Bauman’s books are a perfect pretext to -  as well as 
a perfect point of departure for -  the discussion of postmodernity. 
Bauman’s texts can be perfectly located in a certain wider manner 
of thinking about culture and society present today, and perhaps 
therefore we would like to assume here the following guiding 
principle (of a sort); we will be reading Bauman and commenting 
on his texts immediately, we will be undressing his metaphors and 
suggesting different ones, linking his thinking with that of those he
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never refers to, or does it rarely and unwillingly. We will be 
presenting a more general commentary to a more detailed one, 
taking samples from his various books and looking at them through 
a magnifying glass of a philosophical investigation. We will place 
some fragments in "proper" contexts, listening carefully to the 
author’s intentions, some others we will violently pull out of the 
context, without taking into account the possible damage and 
destruction of harmony of the author’s well-groomed garden of 
thought. Bauman’s text will be providing life-blood to our reflection, 
it will be giving it more power with power of its own.
Let us take into consideration the opening sentence from 
Freedom, Bauman’s book on freedom published in 1988, which is 
the sentence quoted by him from common knowledge just in order 
to promptly repudiate it: "You can say what you wish. This is a free 
country".24 The author dismantles it and listens to its possible 
senses when he says e.g. that
We can do what we wish, without fear of being punished, 
thrown in jail, tortured, persecuted. Let us note, however, 
that the expression is silent about how effective our 
action will be. "Free country" does not guarantee that 
what we do will reach its purpose, or what we say will be 
accepted. ... And so the expression tells us also that 
being in a free country means doing things on one’s own 
responsibility. One is free to pursue (and, with luck, to 
achieve) one’s aims, but one is also free to err.25
And there is no way to disagree with the above. We can, 
however, look at the above sentence from a different perspective 
of the one who made a living of speaking and writing, whose task 
it was to speak and write, who was even listened to: from the 
perspective of the man of letters endowed with the Enlightenment 
authority, one of those les philosophes, an inhabitant of la
24 Zygmunt Bauman, Freedom (London: Open University Press, 1988), p. 1.
25 Ibidem, p. 1.
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république des lettres and then -  following the "Dreyfus affair" -  
just l ’intellectuel.26
So: "You can say what you wish. This is a free country". 
Philosophy (and, more generally, the whole culture of today), 
despite misleading appearances of having found a solution to that 
problem by way of taste, decency, even the law, is still having 
trouble within itself with those who are taking the statement too 
seriously. Questions of an ethical nature are being born all the 
time. Nobody knows for sure which standards to appeal to, as 
together with the exhaustion of the Enlightenment project which 
has brought its own figure of an intellectual to highest peaks, what 
is also getting exhausted is the power that place was still recently 
giving and which those in question made use of. As long as it was 
clear what the role and place of an intellectual in culture was (an 
intellectual in a European, especially French sense of the term, 
rather unknown in the United States, which seems not to know or 
have known such a role as played by Habermas in Germany or 
Sartre and later -  at least functionally -  Foucault in France), it was 
easy to pass judgements on others as the canon of behavior was 
as known as the model of one meter from Sevres near Pahs. 
Today, however, in a totally new and -  still -  unexpected situation, 
there appear questions for which there are no ready answers. 
Numerous philosophers participate in thinking about these 
questions -  the question is a spark from which an interesting 
polemic takes its origin.
Let us take the following point into consideration, departing for 
a moment from Bauman’s books to take a long detour to return to 
them after a while: what may underlie such a concentration of 
attention and energy on seemingly simple questions about life on 
the one hand, and work on the other hand, of several twentieth 
century philosophers and theorists, or on absurd and seemingly 
easy to refute theses of several inspired historians (revisionists) 
of the Holocaust. So, to put it clearly: for instance, Martin
26 See in this context about the "Dreyfus Affair" the chapter "Emil Zola: the 
Citizen Against the State" from The Dreyfus Affair and the American Conscience 
by Egal Feldman (Wayne State University Press, 1981) or Jean-Denis Bredin, 
The Affair. The Case of Alfred Dreyfus (New York: George Braziller, 1986), the 
third section entitled "Two Frances", pp. 245-358.
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Heidegger, Paul de Man, Robert Faurisson (bearing in mind 
relative insignificance and caricatural nature of the latter figure). 
What Heidegger said -  and about what he kept silence when 
others were speaking or leaving Germany which was full of hatred 
at the time, and when others were speaking having returned to 
post-war Germany. Why Heidegger kept silence right until his 
death, even in his Spiegel interview, his silence was indeed 
"unbearable" and "inexcusable".27 Was Paul de Man a hidden 
anti-Semite when he was engaged in his Belgium wartime 
journalism, was he an anti-Semite later on, at Yale? What is 
common to Nietzsche, Heidegger, de Man -  and Derrida in all 
these ethical contexts? What is going to happen to deconstruction 
(as an American school of literary criticism) in the light of all these 
"revelations", widely used e.g. by the press? And finally Robert 
Faurisson who explicitly negates the existence of gas chambers 
in Auschwitz: what did he betray and break away from that he was 
able to incite such an intellectual storm in France, as he must have 
betrayed something, for, just like in the case of previous questions, 
the wound was so painful that needed years-long polemics from 
various French thinkers at the same time. How to "live with 
Faurisson" (to treat that casus a little bit wider), how to "discuss" 
with him, without bringing him to the (undeserved) level of a partner 
in discussion who is endowed with equal rights? These are some 
ethical questions of France and the United States (although, it is 
important to bear in mind, that, in Lyotard’s formulation, L’affaire 
Heidegger est une affaire française), these are some questions of 
philosophers who take their culture seriously and who has 
sensitive ears to what is going on in it. How frail the place in culture 
of an intellectual in France today must be if a Faurisson is able to 
bother so much so many eminent philosophers? Pierre 
Vidal-Naquet in all his essays from the volume Les Assassins de 
la mémoire: ’Un Eichmann de papier' et autres essais sur le 
révisionisme returns constantly to a question fundamental to him: 
is one to get into "polemics” with theses of revisionists, how not to
27 As Jean-Francois Lyotard in Heidegger and "the jews" (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1990) and Ph. Lacoue-Labarthe in already 
referred to Heidegger, Art and Politics put it.
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ennoble them by means of locating them within a scientific debate, 
how to write knowing that the discussion with Faurisson is, as he 
puts it, "absolutely impossible"28 29*, how to fight with lies and bad 
faith -  and fight or not fight? Truth has always been supposed to 
defend itself, but it seems to be too weak. What did Noam 
Chomsky say in his "preface" to Faurisson’s book Memoire en 
defense and is such a version of the right of free expression worth 
being defended? Such and similar questions are being currently 
asked all over the world, in books and articles, during seminars 
and conferences; what is the "freedom of an intellectual" -  and 
what is his "ethics" today. When undisturbed being of leaders of 
human souls is being disturbed, these leaders go in for 
se lf-ana lys is , they deal with them selves or with the ir 
predecessors, they look for their own definitions of themselves 
(and therefore Zygmunt Bauman says in Legislators and 
Interpreters tha t a ll d e fin itio n s  of in te lle c tu a ls  are 
"self-definitions ). When their self-image is shaking, then so is 
their place in culture, life-long vocation, the meaning of their work 
as well as the effort to question the reality. It is not accidentally that 
the questions about thinkers shown here as examples are 
important today -  some twenty years ago nobody would care so 
much about them, nobody would pay so much attention (let us also 
remember that, generally, they are still not important in America
o n
except for some Continentally-minded thinkers). A well-formed, 
modern ethos of an intellectual is commonly known, it seemed to
28 Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Assassins of Memory. Essays on the Denial of the 
Holocaust (Columbia University Press, 1992), p. 2.
29 Zygmunt Bauman, Legislators and Interpreters. On Modernity, 
Post-Modernity and Intellectuals (Oxford: Polity Press, 1987), p. 8.
"Perhaps one should separate an intellectual’s "speaking" from his 
"writing"? Perhaps an intellectual is only the one who is writing (starting with -  
written -  Zola’s "Manifesto of the Intellectuals"), although one can also look at 
the collection of famous pictures: Sartre and Foucault, two giants of post-war 
France, Foucault speaking with a megaphone, Sartre handing in leaflets to 
passers-by. Smiling, happy, speaking to the crowd gathered around. May '68 is 
in turn a (written) "narrative explosion" (Lyotard), but also a madness of loud 
speaking after years of silence, the beginning of struggle with the "confiscation 
of a discourse", as Foucault and Deleuze called it. So perhaps he should speak 
-  but only if he had written before?
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be present in culture for good. Now culture changes its mind and 
seems to take rights and privileges off from him.
Within the horizon that interests us here, let us take into 
consideration, by way of an example, a couple of great figures from 
philosophy of the recent two hundred years who determined the 
shape of today’s Continental philosophy -  (Kojeve’s) Hegel and 
(Derrida’s and Deleuze’s) Nietzsche. Alexandre Kojeve said:"... 
the future of the world, and thereby the meaning of the present 
and the sense of the future, will depend, in the final analysis, on 
the contemporary interpretations of Hegelian works"31 32, to shorten 
it and to disregard nuances -  the future of the world will depend 
on our reading of Hegel. It is important today to remember the 
earnestness of the belief and the constant presence of it in the 
tradition of philosophy, common, incidentally, also to Husserl from 
his last lectures in Prague and Vienna and to Heidegger after 
Kehre to whom one can attribute a (paraphrazed) saying -  the 
future of the (German) world -  but also that of Europe -  will depend 
on our reading of Hölderlin. Let us read Hegel and let us read 
Hölderlin, let us read the Thinker and let us read the Poet, and we 
shall influence the world directly and effectively... The questions 
about Hegel, as is well known, dominated (almost) whole French 
post-war thought -  as Michel Foucault said in L’Ordre du discourse 
in 1970: "our whole epoch is trying to disengage itself from Hegel", 
as Hegel from Phenomenology of Spirit in an anthropologized 
reading of Kojeve used to dominate the great part of philosophical 
imagination of the French for over a quarter of a century.33 A 
violent contrast to -  and antidote against -  Hegel became 
Nietzsche, but not the Nietzsche as seen over the period of thirty 
years by Walter Kaufman in the USA (in his influential Nietzsche:
31 Alexandre Kojeve, cited in Vincent Descombes, Modem French 
Philosophy (Cambridge, CUP, 1980), p. 9.
32 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe wrote about Hölderlin -  whose "imagined 
Greece" influenced the German imagination starting with Hegel, then through 
Nietzsche and finally Heidegger -  in the volume Typography, Mimesis, 
Philosophy, Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), in the text 
"Hölderlin and Greeks", pp. 236-247.
33 About which reminds Vincent Descombes in his Modern French 
Philosophy in a chapter on "humanization of nothingness", pp. 9-54.
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Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist) but rather Nietzsche as 
seen by the French of the sixties first (and then, in the eighties, in 
America by e.g. Alexander Nehamas and Richard Rorty34). 
Nietzsche who is light and "perspectival", the author of "Truth and 
Lies in the Extra-Moral Sense" rather than the author of The Will 
to Power, a self-creator who asks about "style" (Derrida) and who 
has a "sense of humor" (Rorty) rather than a philosopher full of 
seriousness and convinced of his "mission", "used" (or “abused") 
later on by still more serious philosophers like Heidegger.
The passage from Hegel to Nietzsche took place in French 
culture in the sixties and since then it is quite rare to hear someone 
saying that the (Kojevian) "future of the world" may depend on the 
reading of Nietzsche, or of any other philosopher, to be exact. 
(And I have discussed it in more detail in the excursus on "Hegel 
and Rorty"). The most explicit about it is Richard Rorty, which 
brings violent storms to his philosophizing from both sides, both 
from the (philosophical and political) right and from the left, that is 
also what Zygmunt Bauman says, although not in a vocabulary of 
the history of philosophy and that of philosophy itself but in the 
vocabulary of sociological reflection or in fundamental metaphors 
built by him. Bauman’s "powerlessness of an intellectual", his 
gradual "retreat to the Academy"35, subsidized and devoid of any 
contact with resistant matter of reality, his interpretive rather than 
\egislative reason, his metaphors of a "vagabond" and a "tourist" 
-  translated into philosophical language -  may just mean the 
awareness of the end of traditional attitudes not of a philosopher, 
but of an intellectual in general. Intimations of Postmodernity, 
Legislators and Interpreters, and fin a lly  Modernity and
34 See Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche. Life as Literature (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1985) and R. Rorty, CIS.
35 Zygmunt Bauman, Intimations of Postmodernity (London: Routledge, 
1992). Let us listen to these descriptions: "Having reached the nadir of their 
political relevance, modern intellectuals enjoy freedom of thought and expression 
they could not dream of at the time that words mattered politically. This is an 
autonomy of no practical consequence outside the self-enclosed world of 
intellectual discourse”, p. 16). Paradoxically enough, at least apparently, the 
growth in the irrelevance of legitimation -  traditionally provided to the state by 
intellectuals -  brings about the growth in intellectual freedom that, at the same 
time, stops to mean anything in practice.
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Ambivalence seem to testify in a totally different language to the 
same phenomenon of postmodern world: diagnozed by Lyotard 
l ’incrédulité à l ’egard des métarécits, incredulity common and 
justified, brings about a crisis of the producer of those 
metanarratives (as Lyotard put it crudely in his Tombeau de 
l ’intellectuel). Reading Bauman in such a context -  among such 
thinkers as Foucault, Rorty, Lyotard or his favorite, Baudrillard - 
may turn out to be extremely instructive, accounting for the very 
same phenomena in a different vocabulary, in totally different 
metaphors and within a different tradition of thinking about culture 
in general.
One can think whether it might not be the case that the pair 
Hegel/Nietzsche is some parallel of modern and postmodern 
intellectuals, needless to say, such Hegel from behind of whom 
Kojève the Marxist and the Heideggerian is winking at us, and such 
Nietzsche who is opposed to Hegel in the strongest way perhaps 
by Deleuze in Nietzsche and Philosophy. Asking what Hegel was 
doing - and what was doing Nietzsche, and how French thought 
made a radical passage from the former to the latter, we are asking 
about a (new) figure of an intellectual today, as the change of his 
or her status may be also a consequence of that passage. 
Nietzsche may turn out to be a key turning point for today’s 
discussions, from Derrida and Deleuze, Deleuze and Guattari 
from Anti-Oedipus, Lyotard from Economie libidinale, or -  in the 
USA where discussions of Nietzsche became fervent in the 
eighties -  Allan Bloom on the one hand (with his "Nietzscheanized 
America") and Richard Rorty on the other (in whom Nietzsche is 
opposed to Heidegger -  the one who "took philosophy (too) 
seriously", as he says in the title of one of his reviews36). "The New 
Nietzsche", to hint at David Allison’s influential volume, becomes 
in this context an important question today, and the link between 
"intellectual", "freedom" and Nietzsche may be a link of a 
fundamental importance.
Thus one could think of two opposite poles in thinking about the 
role of philosophy: on the one pole there would be Hegel (and 
Kojève) who link the fate of the world to philosophy (as well as a
36 Richard Rorty, "Taking Philosophy Seriously", New Republic, April 1988.
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"serious" Heidegger -  who tells us to read Hölderlin -  and even 
the "last metaphysician" and the "inverted Platonic" Nietzsche in 
the reading of the latter), one the other one there would be the 
same Nietzsche but this time as a model of self-creation who is 
not bothered by the fate of the world because has different 
questions and different troubles (closer e.g. to Marcel Proust). The 
differences of positions taken appear still today e.g. when what 
Heidegger did (wrote, said) in the famous year of 1933 is being 
discussed. Lyotard and Lacoue-Labarthe write that Heidegger’s 
silence about the Holocaust is impardonnable, while Rorty wants 
to separate Heidegger’s "life" from his "work" saying that the latter 
as a person turned out to be "a nasty figure", which, nevertheless, 
does not affect much his philosophy (and it is easy according to 
him to conceive of "another possible world" in which he actually 
leaves Germany -  and we are reading today the same philosophy 
of his37 38).
4.
Having finished this somehow long detour, let us have a quick 
look at a certain traditional and well-rooted model in sociological 
and philosophical thinking of culture; Zygmunt Bauman says about 
it the following:
All wills are free, but some wills are freer than others; 
some people, who knowingly or unknowingly perform the 
function of educators, instil (or modify) the cognitive 
predispositions, moral values and aesthetic preferences 
of others and thus introduce certain shared elements into
oo
their intentions and ensuing actions.
And here we are, with this one simple sentence, in the very 
heart of controversies that we are interested in -  from the Platonic 
notion of basileia (leading to philosophers-kings), from the 
"Seventh Letter", via Kant’s "Was ist Aufklärung?" and its
37 Richard Rorty, "Another Possible World", Proceedings on Heidegger’s 
Politics, October 1988.
38 Zygmunt Bauman, Freedom, p. 6.
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Foucauldian interpretations, via Hegel -  for whom it was a period 
of "madness", as he puts it, when he though of himself as being 
an incarnation of the Absolute Spirit (as a mortal can only be God 
for Kiryllovfrom The Possessed), to Heidegger’s Führung and his 
belief that a philosopher can be a part of something greater, e.g. 
of that "movement" glorified perhaps for purely philosophical 
reasons rather than personal and mean ones... The quotation from 
Bauman leads us also to the consideration of the belief from 
"Theses on Feuerbach" that Die Philosophen haben die Welt nur 
verschieden interpretiert; es kommt aber draufen, sie zu veränder
*  Q Q
that Derrida takes into account in his recent Specters de Marx. 
As it is one of constant motifs of the tradition of philosophy -  there 
is a group of people who know more than others due to having 
access to a (revealing and being revealed) truth, who disclose truth 
with the help of their intellects and -  if need be -  present it to the 
world in a softer, more common way. The religious metaphor of a 
shepherd and the herd fits here perfectly (and let us bear in mind 
that for Bauman, ethics is e.g. a common task for "philosophers, 
educators and preachers"39 40), a philosopher-prophet has always 
told people "what to do". He is an unquestionable authority as he 
knows the deepest (the metaphors of removing surface layers of 
appearances to get to a hidden essence!) context, the 
philosophical one. An authority that looks at things and judges 
them "from a philosophical point of view", that is, from the point of 
view of the world, humanity, the universal rather than the particular, 
the eternal rather than the contingent etc. etc. The conversation 
with him required one to raise (Platonic "cave" metaphors again!) 
to a philosophical level on the part of the interlocutor. As Rorty 
wrote in his Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature -  a philosopher 
expressed his opinion about all questions, and his voice was the 
most important one in almost any discussion (as he was supported 
by the authority of philosophy itself).
Bauman says that "the free individual, far from being a universal 
condition of humankind, is a historical and social creation".41
39 See Jacques Derrida, Spectres de Marx. L'Etat de la dette, le travaille du 
deuil et la nouvelle Internationale (Paris: Galilée, 1993).
40 Zygmunt Bauman, Two Essays on Postmodern Ethics, p 41.
41 Zygmunt Bauman, Freedom, p.7.
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Freedom of an individual cannot be taken for granted, it is a relative 
novelty in the history of mankind, "a novelty closely connected with 
the advent of modernity and capitalism".42 Bauman’s melancholic 
remark about the advent -  and possible departure -  of freedom 
has to be supplemented by an optimistic vision, also supported by 
an awareness of common contingency, the vision of freedom as 
a historical, social creation, but also one that human beings create 
themselves. The vision of freedom in self-creation and through 
self-creation in the situation in which there is no other "road to 
freedom". And when Bauman refers (allusively) to Orwell from 
Animal Farm - why there are supposed to be voices of equal and 
more equal, free and freer wills -  then one could suggest an 
answer that such voices and such wills may be coined in arduous, 
individual effort, and that, surely, their freedom and significance of 
their voices do not come today from some legitimacy, from power 
of the discipline they represent, in the name of which they express 
their views. So in the situation in which the place traditionally 
(historically and socially) accorded to an intellectual in culture is 
getting more and more deserted, one perhaps might attempt to 
take it on a quite different basis, with one’s own effort, with the help 
of power of one’s own projects... Rorty’s "freedom as recognition 
of contingency"43 and Bauman’s (quoted from Agnes Heller) motto 
about "transforming our contingency into our destiny" from 
Modernity and Ambivalence may have a lot in common although 
with one important exception -  Rorty’s account leads optimistically 
to the awareness of the possibility of surpassing oneself, 
Bauman’s account may (though does not necessarily have to) lead 
to fatalism. The fatalism can be heard in Agnes Heller:
An individual has transformed his or her contingency into 
his or her destiny if this person has arrived at the 
consciousness of having made the best out of his or her 
practically infinite possibilities. A society has transformed 
its contingency into a destiny if the members of this 
society arrive at the awareness that they would prefer to
42 Ibidem, p. 7.
43 Richard Rorty, CIS, p. 47.
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live at no other place and at no other time than here and 
44now.
It seems better not to have the feeling of fulfilment, and to aim 
always at something which cannot be reached, rather than to live 
with the possibility that one is a citizen of the only accessible, and 
at the same time the "best" of possible worlds (as we remember 
Faust promising to give in to Mephistopheles in Goethe the 
moment he is satisfied with a "moment", saying "Let it last! It is 
beautiful!"). It may be better not to fix the level of possibilities on 
the one of reality... It may be better to trust (Romantic) imagination, 
w ith  all postm odern  rese rva tions , than (to ta lita r ia n ) 
self-complacency of inhabitants of Oceania or Eurasia... It is 
important to remember about threats of fatalism and of melancholy 
of that Bauman’s vision.
Thus freedom in Bauman’s account is a construct to which we 
are not allowed to get accustomed, as the world of which it is a 
product is contingent itself, and may disappear any time at all. That 
is a philosophically justified melancholy, but it may be also 
connected with melancholy or pessimism so evident in Michel 
Foucault - in his account of "power". Freedom, Bauman says, is 
not a a property, a quality which an individual can have or can not 
have, "freedom exists only as a social relation": "It makes sense 
only as an opposition to some other condition, past or present".4 5 
Just like there are no free and coerced, there are also no ruling 
and ruled, those who hold power and fight to maintain it and those 
who are deprived of it and dream of having it, as "power is 
everywhere", it is of a "capillary" nature, as it penetrates 
everything... It is a relation rather than a property whose some 
(chosen) possess, others (temporarily worse-off) do not possess, 
but might do if only they made another effort, another step on the 
road leading to emancipation, if they only wished to -  preferably 
by means of the revolution which would "seize" power. Power in 
this account is not something that one seizes, then losses, power
44 Agnes Heller quoted in Z. Bauman, Modernity and Ambivalence (Oxford: 
Polity Press, 1992), p. 234.
45 Zygmunt Bauman, Freedom, p. 7, p. 7.
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works from a multitude of points, from below, in a word: "power is 
everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it 
comes from everywhere", as Michel Foucault says in the first 
volume of his History of Sexuality.46 One does not "have" freedom 
(Bauman) just like one does not "have" power (Foucault). Freedom 
-  like power in such an account -  exists only between individuals. 
Both accounts are pessimistic, the first leaves little room for will to 
individual freedom, the other leaves little room for hope for 
resistance, for which Foucault was reproached many times during 
his life and afterwards.47
If we were to look for a moment to the most famous Odyssey 
of Spirit, the Hegelian Phenomenology, then it would turn out that 
freedom can organize thinking about history and history of 
philosophy perfectly well. From the freedom of an "oriental 
despot", and only his, via freedom of some, that is to say, freedom 
of that "top of an iceberg" in Ancient Greece in Hegel’s memorable 
expression, to the culmination of freedom in the period of 
(post)revolutionary France -  in a radical contrast to the "misery" 
of German life, on the one hand; on the other hand the dialectic of 
HerrschaftundKnechtschaftand struggle for recognition, freedom 
only as freedom recognized by the Other, deprived of it (who 
promptly, however -  owing to his work -  turns out to be more free 
than his master as the latter appears from a distance to be just a 
dead end of history, une impasse existentielle, as Kojeve says of 
him48). The Idea of Emancipation turns out today to be a more and 
more a modern illusion, perhaps the greatest and the most 
persistent metanarrative. Incredulity towards it, however, is 
something else than incredulity towards freedom. There is 
perhaps the possibility of freedom without the Idea of
46 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality. An Introduction, vol. I (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1978), p. 93.
47 The role of "hope" with reference to Foucault is most important to Richard 
Rorty. The reproaches I have in mind come e.g. from Michael Walzer from the 
text on "lonely politics of Michel Foucault" in his The Company of Critics or from 
Edward Said from his "Foucault and the Imagination of Power" in Foucault: A 
Critical Reader, ed. D. Hoy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).
48 Alexandre Kojève, Introduction à la lecture de Hegel (Paris: Gallimard, 
1947), p. 25.
Emancipation. How is one to reconcile the lack of arche and telos 
at the same time, the lack of simple history as an incarnation of 
the Idea of emancipation of the humanity (Napoleon on the 
outskirts of lena would be such a simple history), preferably with 
the help of the power of Reason appreciated by Enlightenment - 
with dreams of "free man" from declarations and constitutions of 
the times of the Revolution? It seems, to push the differences to 
an extrem e, tha t the answ er today m ight be the 
(Nietzschean-Bloomian-Rortyan) self-creation, but it might also be 
the (Baumanian-Baudrillardian) fatalism and melancholy, to 
sketch here caricatures of two extreme possibilities of attitudes. 
Since how is one to describe such statements as Bauman’s: "In 
our society, individual freedom is constituted as, first and foremost, 
freedom of the consumer"49 50from Freedom or
No determination, no chance; just a soft, pliable game 
without set or predictable denouement, a game which 
exhausts itself fully in the aggregate of players and their 
moves. ... This world promises no security but no 
impotence either; it offers neither certainty nor despair; 
only the joy of a right move and the grief of a failed one
from a gloomy, para-Baudrillardian picture drawn in Mortality,
SOImmortality and Other Life Strategies.
Indeed, the first choice to be made would be to abandon "the 
vocabulary parasitic on the hope of (or determination for) 
universality, certainty and transparency", as we are fully aware of 
the omnipresence of contingency, the question appears, however, 
whether we can afford the luxury of "abandoning all hopes" (to 
refer to a classic formulation)? Instead of lost hopes there may be 
enough room for other hopes, smaller, more moderate, one of 
them might perhaps be (philosophical, literary, artistic, emotional 
etc.) self-creation. Then there might be a chance that one will be 
a consumer, which is probably inescapable today, but not a
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49 Zygmunt Bauman, Freedom, pp. 7-8.
50 Zygmunt Bauman, Mortality, Immortality and Other Life Strategies (Oxford: 
Polity Press, 1992), p. 187.
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consumer first and foremost. "Freedom of a consumer" and the 
very Baudrillardian /a société de consommation are strongly 
pessimistic motifs if one is to use them to study postmodern 
society. Sometimes Bauman, like Baudrillard, like Foucault, does 
not leave much hope for a reader, he may appear then as a 
grave-digger of modernity who enters postmodernity with a sense 
of depression, but sometimes he presents a bright and ravishing 
picture of today’s culture, as in Two Essays on Postmodern 
Morality and in Postmodern Ethics, to which I devote the last 
section of this chapter.
5.
Bauman’s books are to a large extent works of a moralist in the 
best sense of the term who is bothered by moral dilemmas of 
modernity and postmodernity. Two Essays on Postmodern 
Morality published in Polish and Postmodern Ethics published in 
English seem to be the culmination of these moral deliberations.51 
Let us confine ourselves here to the former book, though. Bauman 
says in it for instance the following:
we know today ... that morality has neither its cause nor 
its reason -  that the necessity of being moral as well as 
the sense of the moral cannot be logically deduced or 
demonstrated. Morality appears to us today as a 
phenomenon as contingent as the rest of being -  as 
deprived of foundations as the rest of being, in its case 
ethical ones.52
It is so, however, that today’s loss of belief in foundations as 
such is not by any means reducible to the past belief that ethical 
foundations have not been discovered yet, the author makes it 
precise. What results from it for us, those living in postmodernity? 
It means for us sharpening of our own moral responsibility, as we 
are "facing the chaos", which is to say at the same time that we 
are "facing the ’bare truth’ of moral dilemmas as well as looking in
51 Zygmunt Bauman, Postmodern Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).
52 Zygmunt Bauman, Two Essays on Postmodern Morality, p. 51.
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the eyes of our own moral independence".53 Postmodern world 
appears for Bauman as a chance for one’s own responsibility and 
one’s own choice rather than responsibility and choice grounded 
in metanarratives. Each moral step is difficult as it is one’s own 
step as we are deprived of any big moral background and big moral 
advisors of modernity. So the consciousness of contingency is 
total. We ourselves are contingent as children of time and chance 
(as Rorty likes to put it), our personality is contingent, as well as 
society in which we are leading our (contingent) lives. Philosophy 
that we are dealing with assumes a contingent form, the form 
determined just by other contingencies (as a great skeptic Odo 
Marquard says in a subtitle of a fragment from his Apologie des 
Zufälligen: "We human beings are always more our contingencies 
than our choices"54). We are drowning in an ocean of 
contingencies having lost the grounds of a clearly fixed 
determination... Deprived of a supporting point, accustomed to it 
for such a long time, we are waving our hands crying for help which 
will never come as it cannot come... "Ethical paradox of 
postmodernity" - "moral responsibility comes together with the 
loneliness of moral choice", as Bauman says in Intimations of 
Postmodernity...55
How is one to live in a moral world devoid of traditional 
foundations? How is one to live in a world "without an alternative" 
(i.e. without the other pole of a nourishing utopia)? How is one to 
live if philosophy is supposed to be just a (Rortyan) "conversation 
of mankind"? How, and for how long, can one -  meaningfully, 
usefully and "interestingly" -  converse about philosophy within the 
framework of a philosophical language game? What at the same 
time, however, is the alternative to the postmodern cultural 
conversation (of those "name-droppers" from Consequences of 
Pragmatism) -  perhaps the only alternative is a much worse deep 
illusion of one’s own philosophical necessity and, in broaderterms, 
the necessity of philosophy itself... Bauman writes about "ethically 
non-grounded morality" -  "uncontrolled and unpredictable". The
53 Ibidem, p. 50, p. 80, p. 84.
54 Odo Marquard, In Defence of the Accidental (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1991), p. 118.
5SZygmunt Bauman, Intimations of Postmodernity, p. xxii.
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loneliness of moral choice is that of man devoid of higher than 
"here and now" senses, of plans further than the hie et nunc 
generation. But it is always to be born in mind that the greatest 
fear (at least in modernity) had always come from those in whom 
flame in eyes had been accompanied by the certainty of a rightly 
chosen Idea, rightly chosen telos, rather than from mere 
psychopaths. Telos used to sanctify crimes of today, sanctify 
present wrongs, being a bright point in the future which gives birth 
to darkness on the earth today (let us remind here of Bakunin and 
Nietshayev’s "Catechism of a Revolutionary": "a revolutionary 
breaks any possible connection with a civilized world. If he is in 
touch with it, it is only in order to destroy it" or "What ought to be 
moral for a revolutionary is what co-operates with revolution, what 
ought to be immoral and criminal for him is what stands in its way"). 
"Legislative", modern thinking brings about "gardener" practice, 
weeds are being pulled out on the basis of hygienic procedures. 
A legislator-gardener as a modern incarnation of evil, evil that is 
born just because someone "knows better" what others want? 
How, in Max Horkheimer’s words, to "be on the side of the temporal 
against merciless eternity"? How to live when no "horror!" (to use 
that unforgettable expression of Kurtz from the ending of The Heart 
of Darkness) can be explained by means of tension between 
(inexisting but promised) future and (all-too-known) present? 
When the present is no longer merely another point of a pilgrimage 
to a known goal, no longer another -  still higher each time -  stage 
in coming to the promised land, no longer another suffering here 
for the sake of future brightness there? Bauman says that "what 
was at stake was that the future should prove that the effort had 
not been fruitless; that the future ought to be forced in advance to 
provide legitimation for the effort ex post facto".56
Obviously, the "effort" here may be also a soft euphemism, one 
could perhaps just say: it was often hatred, a crime, a lie (not the 
Greek, "noble" one). Obviously, modern, rational -  hatred, crime 
and lie -  because, as Bauman says, "feelers of hesitations go 
deep: to the very heart of the ’project of Modernity’".57 Modernity 
and the Holocaust is a moving testim ony to Bauman’s
56Zygmunt Bauman, Two Essays on Postmodern Morality, p. 56.
57 Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, p. 65.
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disappointment first, then his disbelief and anger, then, finally, his 
accusation... Therefore the author does not spare philosophers of 
modernity when he says that "universality was the weapon and 
honor of philosophers" -  but today little in the world seems to 
depend on what, and if anything at all, they are saying, as
there are no bachelors willing to marry the truth of 
philosophers, and philosophy no longer sees any 
remedy against spinsterhood.58
There is no longer any history -  there is just a chronology, there 
is no progress -  just development, no great plans -  just 
contingency, and in Bauman’s view philosophers are not to 
blamed for it. As, in his vivid description summarizing in a way a 
hundred or so years of history of philosophy, "it all happened not 
because philosophers were not able to put a temporary and 
contingent being on a solid foundation. It is rather that tools and 
building materials were taken from them -  and not in order to hand 
them to others, but to throw them away on the garbage heap of 
lost hopes and failed promises where dreams of common rules of 
Reason had already been put".59 Thus today’s culture -  in a 
common view of Bauman on the one hand, and "postmodernists" 
(in its European rather than American sense of the vague term) 
on the other -  seems not to be looking for successors of 
philosophers, nobody seems to compete with them today, as they 
used to compete with priests and scientists in the past. Great 
metanarratives -  with the one of Emancipation in the forefront - 
have been severely dirtied and dreadfully abused. Hence 
incredulity, hyper-sensitivity and carefulness of the philosophical 
discourse of postmodernity. Especially considering the fact that 
while the role of normative, universal ethics seems to be commonly 
criticized, the sense of justice and injustice (Lyotard’s "wrong" as 
opposed to a mere "damage", his tort and his dommage) or the 
sensitivity to pain and humiliation (e.g. in Rorty’s utopian figure of 
a "liberal ironist") are still growing. Philosophers, to sum up, do not
58 Zygmunt Bauman, Two Essays on Postmodern Morality, p. 58, p. 59.
59 Ibidem, p. 59.
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give their privileges to someone else as they received them once 
from priests, it is rather that the very privileges disappear, turning 
out to be a useful illusion produced for the needs of modernity...
It is not easy to reconcile with it for quite a few. To return to 
Bauman, "legislators cannot think of the world without legislation; 
ethical legislators cannot think of society without ethical 
legislation".60 The decline of ethics does not necessarily have to 
mean the decline of morality, in a new vocabulary of moral 
deliberation of-post-ethical, post-legislative-postmodernity, one 
of the key words will surely be responsibility. For people at large 
with unprecedented freedom (Hegelian entiassen from  
Phenomenology given to them may be building their moral identity 
just on responsibility. Moral autonomy may be constituted by 
responsibility itself. Is philosophy (together with ethics) in such a 
case a merely (intellectual) "vagabondage", just like a philosopher 
is a postmodern "vagabond" of the philosophical tradition? Is 
philosophical vagabondage to endure the test of time, will it 
reconcile with its relatively inferior status granted to it by 
postmodern culture? "The path of vagabondage is created during 
journey itself" and nobody knows where it will lead us to -  "the 
point is not to lose the ability to move" (Bauman)...
Thinking of Zygmunt Bauman, but not only of him, let us listen 
to a quotation from Gombrowicz that gives avant la lettre the 
feeling of the postmodern mood:
To be a concrete man. To be an individual. Not to attempt 
at the transformation of the world as a whole -  to live in 
a world changing it as long as it is in accordance with my 
nature. To become realized according to my needs -  
individual needs. I am not saying that the other thought 
-  mass, abstract thought, that Humanity as such, are not 
important. But the balance must be restored. The most 
modern direction of thinking is that which leads to a 
discovery of an individual man {Diary.
60 Ibidem, p. 74.
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Finally, let us ask one more question: how close to each other 
Rorty and Bauman are in their philosophical choices? How close 
Bauman is to Lyotard, Derrida, and Foucault? To what extent the 
philosophical excursus presented here is an imposed "strong 
misreading" produced for the purposes of the present writer (and 
if it were the case "to a large extent", what would be its status -  
would it be about Rorty and others, about Bauman, about today’s 
culture, or merely about the one who wrote it?) How far do all 
engaged in it agree with it -  and what would be the status of their 
agreement or disagreement, what would be appropriate 
consequences of these acts, if any? These are questions that must 
appear on the margins of Rorty’s writings. The answer to them is 
neither simple nor unambiguous in the face of the loss of modern 
innocence which until very recently would give support, certainty 
and legitimation of one’s own place in culture as well as a full, 
tested and reliable set of instruments and tools to investigate 
others’ thinking. Our journey to Rorty’s work together with short 
trips ("excursuses" within it) taken to numerous European contexts 
of his philosophy comes to an end. To the question whether it was 
worth while devoting several years of one’s intellectual life to just 
his philosophizing rather than to someone else’s, the answer is 
simple -  yes, it was, for it is always worth while thinking together 
with great thought, questioning together with it (perhaps it is also 
worth while erring together with it); the point is, it is worth while, 
for it helps in the emergence of the awareness of necessity and 
urgency of searching for one’s own answer to some important 
questions only philosophers still dare to ask.
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